Claim A1 A1 Claim A2 A1
(A1)
It is easy to see that (A1) 
Then the condition for M-H-L to be an equilibrium listing order can be obtained by plugging these solutions in (A1), as follows: three listing orders can be observed in equilibrium: H-M-L, H-L-M, and M-H-L. Given that the main text already showed that H-M-L is always an equilibrium listing order, we prove neither H-L-M nor M-H-L can be an equilibrium listing order.
First, suppose the equilibrium listing order is given by H-L-M. Then Firm L should prefer winning the second slot to losing but Firm M should prefer losing to winning the second slot. These imply,
However, both (A9) and (A10) cannot simultaneously hold if K M < (1−δ)r L v L , because (A10) implies b M ≥ v M , which in turn implies Π L2 ≤ 0 but this contradicts (A9). Therefore, H-L-M cannot be an equilibrium listing order.
Finally, suppose the equilibrium listing order is given by M-H-L. Then Firm M should prefer the first slot to the second, while Firm H should prefer the second slot to the first. These imply,
However, both (A11) and (A12) cannot simultaneously hold. This is because (A11) implies
which is a contradiction. Therefore, no other listing order than H-M-L can be observed in equilibrium. Proof. The conditions imply that Firm H has a binding budget constraint at the first slot and that Firm M has a binding budget constraint at both the first and the second slots. To prove the claim, we first show that M-H-L, M-L-H, L-H-M, and L-M-H cannot be observed in equilibrium (Part 1) and then show the existence of an equilibrium with the rest of the orders (Part 2). Part 1. Suppose the equilibrium listing order is M-H-L. In this case, since Firm H is not budget-constrained in the second slot, Firm M's IC condition is identical to (A11). Then as in the above proof, we have r H b H = r L b L . However, this implies that the following Firm H's IC condition:
is equivalent to,
A3 which contradicts the fact that Firm H is not budget-constrained at the second slot. Thus, there is no such equilibrium.
Suppose the equilibrium listing order is M-L-H. Under this listing order, only Firm M has a binding budget constraint. Then the IC conditions of Firm L and Firm H are:
which imply r L v L ≥ r H v H . This is a contradiction and thus, there is no such equilibrium. Now, suppose the equilibrium listing order is L-H-M. Under this listing order, no advertiser has a binding budget constraint. This implies r L v L > r H v H > r M v M by the result of Section 3.1, which is a contradiction. Thus, there is no equilibrium with the listing order L-H-M.
Finally, suppose the equilibrium listing order is L-M-H. Under this listing order, Firm M has a binding budget constraint at the second slot. Then since Firm L prefers the first rank to the third while Firm H prefers the third rank to the first, we have
which imply r L v L ≥ r H v H . This is a contradiction and thus, there is no equilibrium with the listing order L-M-H.
Part 2. We now show the existence of an equilibrium with the listing orders H-M-L and H-L-M, by giving a numerical example. First suppose that the equilibrium listing order is H-M-L. In this case, if r H = r M = r L = 1, v H = 25, v M = 11, v L = 10, δ = 0.5, C 0 = 1, K H = 9, K M = 4.5, and K L = 15, then the equilibrium bids are given as b M = 10.58 and b L = 9.43 from simultaneously solving (35) and (36). Plugging these solutions back into the IC conditions (32) and (34), we confirm that both are satisfied: Π M 2 = 0.75 > Π M 1 = 0.18 and Π L3 = 1.11 > Π L2 = 0.33. Finally, the budgets satisfy the assumptions:
Thus, there exists an equilibrium with the listing order H-M-L. Now, suppose the equilibrium listing order is H-L-M. Further, suppose Firm H is more budget-constrained than Firm M when Firm M deviates to the second slot. Then the IC conditions are given as follows:
Now to show the existence of the equilibrium, it suffices to find a case where all the IC conditions in (A19)-(A22) hold. Suppose r H = r M = r L = 1, v H = 35, v M = 12, v L = 11, δ = 0.6, and C 0 = 1. If we let K H = 5.5, K M = 1, and K L = 15, then we obtain b L = 10.81 and b M = 4.22 by simultaneously solving (A19) and (A21). 1 Plugging these solutions back into (A20) and (A22), we have Π L2 = 4.71 > Π L1 = 0.19 and Π M 3 = 2.16 > Π M 2 = 1.84 respectively. Thus, all the IC conditions can be satisfied in this case. Finally, the assumptions are satisfied as well:
.59) (with the second condition suggesting that Firm H is more budget-constrained than Firm M in Firm M's deviation to the second slot). Thus, there exists an equilibrium with the listing order H-L-M.
Proof of Proposition 5
First note that in the analysis of the extensions, we consider only two advertisers. Thus, it is sufficient to check the partial derivative in confirming the existence of the bid-raising incentive. To prove Proposition 5, we first derive the equilibrium of a one-shot game in the following lemma.
Lemma A1. Suppose Firm L's bid is exogenously given and let C 1 ≡ r L b L . Further suppose the budget constraints are never binding at the second slot:
Then in the equilibrium of a one-shot bidding game, Firm H always takes the first slot when its budget constraint is not binding at the first slot but both firms can take the first slot when Firm H's budget constraint is binding at the first slot. The specific conditions and the equilibrium solutions are given in the proof.
Proof. We consider the following four cases: (1) when no firm has a binding budget constraint: K i ≥ δr M v M + (1 − δ)C 1 (denote this case by NN), (2) when only Firm H has a binding budget constraint: (4) when both firms are budget-constrained:
We derive the bidding equilibrium in four parts.
Part 1. First consider the NN case. The result of Section 3.1 still holds here and thus the equilibrium listing order is H-M. The IC conditions are given as,
Then Firm M's bid in the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is given as b *
1 In fact, it can be easily shown that dΠ L2 db L > 0 and that dΠ M 3 db M > 0. Thus, the upper bound solutions defined by (A19) and (A21) are indeed equilibrium solutions.
A5
Based on this, Firm H's total advertising cost at the first slot is given from (A24) as,
Thus, the equilibrium profits are given as,
Part 2. Consider the BN case. Since Firm H's budget constraint is binding at the first slot, the listing orders may be either H-M or M-H. Thus, we consider these two listing orders.
First, suppose the equilibrium listing order is H-M. Then the IC conditions are given as,
Firm M's optimal bid amount is determined at the upper bound, by (A28). Thus, Firm H's total advertising cost in equilibrium is given by,
Corresponding profits are given as,
By plugging in (A31) into (A29) and solving for K H , we have the condition for H-M to be an equilibrium listing order, given as follows:
Next suppose the equilibrium listing order is M-H. Then the bids satisfy the following IC conditions:
A6 Then (A36) defines the Pareto-dominant equilibrium and based on this, we derive the total advertising cost of Firm M as well as the profits of both firms as follows:
By plugging the equilibrium solution in (A35), the condition for M-H to be an equilibrium listing order is given as follows:
. Part 3. Consider the NB case. We also consider both listing orders here: H-M and M-H. First, suppose the equilibrium listing order is H-M. Then the IC conditions are given as,
Since Firm M's bid in the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is given as
Firm M's total advertising cost at the first slot is, by (A41),
Then the profits are
For H-M to be an equilibrium listing order, (A40) should hold when the equilibrium solution is plugged in, that is,
M and K (2) M are not defined and H-M is always an equilibrium listing order. Also note that if r
the listing order is given H-M if and only if
M in the specified range for the NB case. Next suppose the listing order is M-H. Then IC conditions are given as,
A7 Firm H's optimal bid amount is determined at the upper bound and thus Firm H's total advertising cost is given from (A47) by,
By plugging the equilibrium bid into (A48) and solving for K M , the condition for M-H to be an equilibrium listing order is given as
but M-H is never an equilibrium listing order otherwise.
Part 4. Finally, consider the BB case. We also consider both listing orders here: H-M and M-H.
When the listing order is H-M, the IC conditions are given as follows:
Since ∂Π M 2 ∂b M > 0, the equilibrium bid is determined at the upper bound defined by (A53). Based on this equilibrium bid, the total advertising cost of Firm H, and the profits of both firms are given as follows:
Plugging the equilibrium bid into (A54), we obtain the condition for H-M to be an equilibrium listing order as follows:
In addition, in equilibrium, both C H ≤ K H and C H ≤ K M should hold and thus based on (A55), we have the following additional conditions:
When the listing order is M-H, the IC conditions are given as follows:
Since ∂Π H2 ∂b H > 0, the equilibrium bid is determined at the upper bound defined by (A61). Based on this equilibrium bid, the total advertising cost of Firm H, and the profits of both firms are given as follows:
Plugging the equilibrium bid into (A62), we obtain the condition for H-M to be an equilibrium listing order as follows:
In addition, in equilibrium, both C M ≤ K H and C M ≤ K M should hold and thus based on (A63), we have the following additional conditions:
(A68)
Proof of Proposition 5. We solve the game using backward induction. In the second period of the bidding game, depending on the result of the first period, there are two subgames: Subgame 1 after (H-M) in the first period, and Subgame 2 after (M-H) in the first period. We solve these two subgames in Part 1, and then move to the first-period game in Part 2. Part 1. Let K i denote Firm i's budget at the beginning of the second period. In this part, we solve the two subgames of Period 2. First consider Subgame 1 (after Firm H takes the first slot and Firm M takes the second slot in the first period). Note that since we consider the case with δr H v H + 2(1 − δ)C 1 ≤ K < 2δr H v H + 2(1 − δ)C 1 , Firm H's remaining budget is constrained at the first slot but not at the second slot, while Firm M's residual budget is not constrained at either slot. Then by Part 2 of Lemma A1, we have the following equilibrium results: when K H ≥ K (1) H , Firm H takes the first slot in Period 2 and, the equilibrium cost and profits are given by,
where C it refers to Firm i's advertising cost in Period t. When K H < K (1) H , Firm H takes the second slot in Period 2 and, the equilibrium cost and profits are given by,
Note that across the two cases, Firm H's profits remain the same due to Firm M's cost-raising bid at the second slot.
Next we consider Subgame 2 (after Firm H takes the second slot and Firm M takes the first slot in the first period). In this case, Firm M's second-period budget constraint is binding at the first slot (but not at the second slot) while Firm H faces no budget constraint at any slot. Then by Part 3 of Lemma A1, we have the following results: since we consider the case where r M v M − C 1 ≤ 4δ(1 − δ)(r H v H − C 1 ) holds, Firm H always takes the first slot in the second period and the equilibrium cost and profits are given by,
Part 2. In this part, we solve the first-period game given the results of the second-period subgames. First suppose Firm H takes the first slot in the equilibrium of the first period. Then, it earns r H v H −C H1 in the first period, and (1−δ)(r H v H −C 1 )(= Π (1)
H ) in the second period regardless of the slot it takes in the second period. In this case, since Firm M takes the second slot in the first period, its profits are (1 − δ)(r M v M − C 1 ), but in the second period, depending on the slot it takes, it earns Π (1) M or Π (2) M . We denote this second-period profit by Π M 2 (C H1 ) given that Firm H's residual budget in Period 2 is given as K H = K − C H1 .
If Firm H deviates to the second slot in Period 1, its profits are (1 − δ)(r H v H − C 1 ) in the first period. In the second period, according to the above result, Firm H always takes the first slot and earns r H v H −
H ), which we denote by Π H2 (C H1 ) given that Firm M's residual budget in Period 2 is given as K M = K − C H1 . In this deviation, Firm M also switches to the first slot and thus its profits are given as r
M ) in the second period. Given the discussion so far, the incentive compatibility conditions when the listing order is H-M are given by (with the discount factor being 1),
A10 where Π M 2 (C H1 ) is Firm M's second period equilibrium profit and Π H2 (C H1 ) is Firm H's second period deviation profit, and they are given as
These conditions can be further reduced to,
Now observe that in (A82), the left-hand side decreases with C H1 while the right-hand side increases with C H1 (noting that K M = K − C H1 on the right-hand side) and that in (A83), the left-hand side increases with C H1 while the right-hand side decreases with C H1 (noting that K H = K − C H1 on the left-hand side). Then, it is easy to see that (A82) defines the upper bound while (A83) defines the lower bound of C H1 . Now, since ∂Π M 2 ∂C H1 > 0, Firm M's equilibrium bid in the first period is determined at the highest possible level and so does Firm H's first-period cost, which, by (A82), is given as:
Given this solution, K−C H1 ≥ K (1) H becomes equivalent to K ≥ K * ≡ K (1)
. This implies that after Firm H takes the first slot in the first period, the second-period listing order is given as H-M if K ≥ K * but M-H otherwise. Moving attention to the first period, the equilibrium listing order is H-M if (A83) holds at the solution given in (A84), i.e., if Π M 2 (C * H1 ) ≥ r M v M − C * H1 holds, but M-H otherwise. 2 Given the second-period result, this condition becomes (1) Π (1)
H1 otherwise, which are respectively equivalent to (1) K * * < K ≤ K * * * and to (2) 
Thus, when K ≥ K * (i.e., when the second-period listing order is H-M in Subgame 1), the first-period listing order is given as H-M if K * * < K ≤ K * * * but as M-H otherwise; when K < K * (i.e., when the second-period listing order is M-H in Subgame 1), the first-period listing order is always given as M-H (since the value K in our consideration is confined to K ≥ δr M v M + 2(1 − δ)C 1 which is always greater than (2 − δ)C 1 ). 3 Therefore, Firm H takes the first slot in both periods (and Firm M takes the second slot in both periods) if max{K * , K * * } < K < K * * * . If K < max{K * , K * * } or K > K * * * holds, Firm H takes the second slot in the first period and then moves up to the first slot in the second period while Firm M shows the opposite pattern.
Finally, depending on the parameter values, each of K * , K * * , and K * * * may fall either within the range of consideration (i.e., [δr M v M + 2(1 − δ)C 1 , 2δr M v M + 2(1 − δ)C 1 ]) or out of this range. However, there exists at least one case of all of K * , K * * , and K * * * falling in the range. For example, when r H = r M = 0.4, v H = 10.2, v M = 10.1, δ = 0.8 and C 1 = 4, we have K * = 4.88, K * * = 5.01, and K * * * = 8.11, and the range of consideration is given by [4.86, 8.13 ]. This completes the proof. 2
Proof of Proposition 6
In this proposition, we derive the optimal budget-setting strategies for both firms. In Lemmas A2 and A3, we first rule out some dominated strategies. We then prove that the remaining strategies constitute a budget-setting equilibrium.
Lemma A2. When allowed to set the budget, neither firm chooses its budget to be binding at the second slot.
Proof. We prove the claim of the lemma in three parts: when the competitor has no budget constraint (in Part 1); when the competitor has a binding budget constraint only at the first slot (in Part 2); and when the competitor's budget is binding at both slots (in Part 3). To facilitate exposition, we use the three letters, N , B, and C, to respectively denote the decision of each firm to set a non-binding budget (N), a budget binding at the first slot (B), and a budget binding at the second slot (C). Based on this notation, we denote each scenario by combining the two letters representing both firms' decisions by the order of Firm H's and Firm M's decisions (e.g., N B, BC, etc.). Part 1. In this part, we examine each firm's incentive to set the budget to be binding at the second slot, when the competitor has no budget constraint (i.e., in CN and N C). Suppose Firm H has no binding budget constraint but Firm M chooses the budget to be constrained at the second slot (K M < (1 − δ)C 1 ): N C. If the equilibrium listing order is H-M, regardless of the equilibrium bid, Firm M's profit at the second slot is always given by,
